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Abstract 
This study uses the UK data and corporation tax changes of 1984 in the UK to test 
the significance of corporation tax as one of the factors influencing systematic risk. 
The extension to the theoretical relationship model between beta of levered equity 
and leverage is made to incorporate corporation tax and establish the testable 
relationship. Using both time series and cross sectional models involving 
fundamental determinants of systematic risk, the study provides an empirical 
evidence that corporation tax is one of the significant determinants of systematic risk 
and that systematic risk is positively related to leverage, effective corporate tax rate, 
return on assets, financial risk, growth in earnings and the risk of real asset., This 
study concludes that corporation tax changes of 1984 in the UK led to a significant 
decrease in firms’ equity betas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of risk-return trade off states that, in equilibrium, higher returns should 
be associated with high risk. The concept establishes that by investors trading in 
efficient capital markets, they should realize returns reflecting the systematic risk they 
assume. One of the models that establish the risk-return relationship by focusing on 
systematic risk is Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM), which uses equity beta as a 
measure of risk and suggests a positive linear relationship between return and risk.  
According to standard CAPM: 
 
]R)R(E[R)R(E fmJfj −+= β  
(1) 
 
Where E (Rj) is expected return on security j, Rf is risk free rate, E (Rm) is expected 
return on market and βj is the systematic risk (or beta) of security j. 
 
Thus, the change in systematic risk (beta) is positively related to change in the 
required rate of return (cost of equity capital).  Using the above relationship, one can 
argue that the factors that affect the systematic risk of a firm may have some effects 
on the cost of equity capital of the firm, and consequently on the value of the firm. 
Under the corporate tax structure followed in most countries, different sources of 
capital employed by a firm may results to different tax cash flows and consequently to 
different firm values. This suggests that corporation tax influences rate of return and 
value of the firm. It is from this understanding that I consider corporation tax to be 
one of the determinants of systematic risk and wish to test its significance in 
determining the systematic risk. The literature considers corporation tax as affecting 
the firm through financial leverage (Auerbach, 1985; Devereux, Bond and Denny, 
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1993; Dammon and Senbet, 1988; Fama and French, 1998; Lasfer, 1995; Mayer, 
1986; Shum, 1996).  
 
The relationship between corporation tax, financial leverage and value of a 
company as suggested by Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) is given by the 
following equation: 
 
( )( dAAe rrT )E
Drr −−+= 1  
(2) 
 
Where, re is return on equity, rA is return on assets, rd is return on debt, T is 
corporation tax rate, D and E are market value of debt and equity respectively. The 
relationship shows that there is a negative relationship between corporation tax rate 
and equity return and consequently systematic risk (beta). The relationship suggests 
that a company financed entirely by equity has a return on equity re equal to rA, and 
that the term ( )( dA rrT )E
D
−−1  reflects the compensation for taking financial risk. If re 
is determined by the market, then compensation for financial risk reflects a level of 
systematic risk arising from using debt in firms’ capital structures. In exploring a way 
in which corporate tax influence systematic risk, it should be noted that the theory of 
corporate financial policy predicts a positive relationship between corporation tax rate 
and D/E ratio (Dammon and Senbet, 1988; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Givoly, 
Hahn, Ofer and Sariq, 1992; Miller and Modigliani, 1963).  To establish a negative 
relationship between corporation tax (T) and return on equity capital (re), I re-write 















Given that rA and rd are constants, it is clear from equation (3) that for a debt-equity 
ratio, D/E, to remain unchanged, an increase (or decrease) in corporation tax rate, T, 
must cause a corresponding decrease (or increase) in return on equity, re. Thus, the 
negative relationship between corporation tax rate and return on equity (and 
consequently systematic risk), ceteris paribus, implies that the negative impact of 
corporation tax on return on equity more than offsets its positive impact on return on 
equity induced by a change in debt-equity.  
 
This study empirically investigated the impact of corporation tax on 
systematic risk by using UK data and the corporation tax changes of 1984.  Using 
both time series and cross sectional regression analysis the results show that 
corporation tax is one of the determinants of systematic risk. In this context the results 
of my study imply that the impact of corporation tax on systematic risk does not 
necessarily manifest itself only through other factors like leverage. The results 
showed that whether or not firms adjusted their capital structure immediately to 
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reflect a change in corporation tax structure, effective corporation tax rate remained a 
relevant determinant of systematic risk.3 The study also found out that the impact of a 
change in corporation tax on systematic risk was inversely related to return on assets.  
 
The study also tested the relationship between equity beta and its fundamental 
determinants as documented in the literature. Study findings support the view that, 
over time, systematic risk is positively related to leverage, effective corporate tax rate, 
return on assets, financial risk, growth in earnings and the risk of real assets. In 
general, this study provided empirical evidence to show that corporation tax is a 
fundamental determinant of systematic risk and that the corporation tax changes of 
1984 in the UK led to a significant decrease in firms’ equity betas. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Both theoretical and empirical studies have analysed the relationship between 
systematic risk (beta) and financial leverage (Hamada, 1972; Ramchand and 
Sethipakdi, 2000). Hamada (1972) used Miller and Modigliani’s (1963) proposition to 
establish a relationship between systematic risk of a levered firm and that of an 
equivalent but unlevered firm. The study does not analyse the relationship between 
corporation tax and leverage but it provides the evidence that approximately 24 
percent of the variations in systematic risk are explained by variations in the debt-
equity ratio. Their findings suggested that factor(s) that affect debt-equity ratio might 
affect the systematic risk. The study by Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) for example, has 
shown that liquidity which is argued to influence debt-equity ratio, is part of 
systematic risk as used in CAPM. Corporation tax, by affecting cash outflow of the 
company affects its liquidity and marketability of its stocks in the financial market 
and is potentially related to systematic risk. 
 
Ramchand and Sethipakdi (2000) used a more general form of the relationship 
between beta of levered equity and that of unlevered equity and show a linear 
relationship between beta of levered common stock (βe) and debt-equity ratio. They 
establish the following relationship: 
 
( ) EDdaae ββββ −+=  
           (4a) 
 
Where eβ  is beta of levered equity, aβ  is beta of assets (a weighted average of betas 
of equity and debt), βd is beta of debt and E
D  is debt-equity ratio. Using (4a) and 
assuming that βd = 0 and that βa is unaffected by capital structure decision (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1958), a change in equity beta is positively related to a change in debt-
equity ratio. More specifically, the change in levered equity beta is given as: 
 
( )EDae ∆=∆ ββ  
           (4b) 
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impact of change in corporation tax on debt-equity ratios. A partial derivation of beta with respect to 
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Using a sample of 147 equity issues between 1986 and 1993, the paper finds that US 
firms which issued equity (that is, decreased their debt-equity ratios) experienced a 
decline in price volatility and systematic risk. It further showed that a decrease in 
systematic risk is sensitive to whether the equity issue was global (that is, issued in 
foreign market) or domestic with a larger decline observed for firms which issued 
equity globally.  As in Hamada (1972), Ramchand and Sethipakdi (2000)’s study also 
ignores factors influencing change in D/E ratio and the fact that there are other 
determinants of beta and debt-equity ratio which might be in operation at the same 
time. There is a need of controlling for the effects of other determinants in 
investigating the relationship between beta and D/E ratio. 
 
Badhani (1997) uses the covariance structure of both levered and unlevered 
equity returns with the market return to show the relationship between levered and 
unlevered equity betas. The study shows the following relationship between beta of 











Where L is a ratio of debt to capital employed, βL is beta of levered equity and βU 
stands for beta of unlevered equity. 
 
  It is clear from (5) that for 0 ≤ L < 1, there is a positive relationship between L 
and βL i.e. an increase (or decrease) in L leads to an increase (or decrease) in βL, 
holding βU constant. Badhani (1997) considers the potential change in βL caused by 
changes in L, but it does not explore the factor(s) influencing the change in L. In this 
paper, I include corporation tax as one of the fundamental factors influencing L and 
asses its impact on systematic risk.  
 
The study by Anderson, Hamid and Prakash (1994) analyses the relationship 
between systematic risk and growth in earnings.  They use non-constant growth, 
Gordon’s valuation model and the security market line to determine the covariance 
between the return on a security and its beta. They show that: 
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The paper concludes that systematic risk is positively correlated with growth in 
earnings.  
 
Chung (1989) shows that systematic risk of common stock is a function of net 
income to net equity ratio, degree of financial leverage (DFL), degree of operating 
leverage (DOL) and firm’s intrinsic business risk as measured by firm’s demand beta 
(BD). Using a logarithmic transformation of the variables and linear cross sectional 
regression model, the study provides evidence that, DFL, DOL and BD have a positive 
effect on systematic risk as hypothesised although only coefficients of DOL and BD 
were found to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
Most empirical studies that have focused on the relationship between 
systematic risk and leverage report a positive relationship between change in leverage 
and change in systematic risk (Chung, 1989; Hamada, 1972; and Ramchand and 
Sethipakdi, 2000). Specifically, these studies found that an increase in leverage led to 
an increase in systematic risk and vice versa. However, Shah (1994) using a more 
focused capital structure change approach, provided results that suggested that 
leverage increases and decreases convey qualitatively different information. Using 
exchange offers, Shah (1994) showed that leverage increasing exchange offers lower 
the investors’ assessment of risk (beta) but leaves the cash flows statistically 
unchanged while leverage decreasing exchange offers have no effect on systematic 
risk but lead to a significant decrease in the expected cash flows. The findings of Shah 
(1994) suggested that a leverage decreasing decision might not lead to a 
corresponding decrease in systematic risk. If his findings hold, then a decrease in 
leverage following the 1984 corporation tax changes might not lead to an expected 
decline in systematic risk. 
 
Campbell and Mei (1993) decomposed beta into three components using 
unexpected excess return on stock. They argued that unexpected excess return is a 
function of revisions in future dividends, news about future real rate of interest and 
news about future excess return on stock. They showed that: 
 
meimrmdimi ,,,, ββββ −−=  
(7) 
 
where  mi ,β  is market beta (defined using unexpected excess returns) 
mdi ,β  is market beta of news about future cash flows of assets i. 
mr ,β  is market beta of news about future real interest rates. 
mei ,β  is market beta of news about future excess return on asset i. 
 
The results showed that cash flow beta varies inversely with firm size. This 
implied that factors such as corporation tax and leverage, which affect cash flows, 
will be related to firm size. For example, since leverage affects cash flows beta 
positively, then the changes in beta following the corporate tax change of 1984 in the 
UK (the change is considered to have a negative impact on leverage), is expected to 
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In summary, most of the reviewed literature suggests determinants of 
systematic risk and how they are likely to influence systematic risk (as measured by 
equity beta). The variables that influence systematic risk as presented in this section 
form a basic set of relevant determinants of equity beta to be included in a model to 
be used in assessing the impact of corporation tax changes of 1984 on systematic risk.  
 
Analysis of the Impact of Corporation Tax Changes on Systematic Risk 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the impact of the 
corporation tax changes of 1984 on the systematic risk; and consequently to provide 
evidence on the significance of corporation tax as a significant determinant of 
systematic risk. The UK’s corporation tax changes of 1984 (see IFS ,2002) involved 
the reduction of the corporation tax rate from 52 percent in 1983 to 35 percent in 1987 
and eliminated initial (or first year) capital allowances (see Appendix A). The changes 
were progressive and affected all companies operating in the UK. The changes were 
also significant and it is considered to be important event to test the tax based 
corporate finance theory. The theory predicts that corporation tax is related to return 
on equity and consequently it implies that is related to equity beta. The changes in 
corporation tax in the UK, as given in Appendix A, are significant and provide a 
relevant event to test tax-related theories. The recent study by Ang, Hodrick, Xing and 
Zhang (2006) shows that time varying volatility induces changes in investment 
opportunity by changing the risk- return trade off. Thus, understanding of the impact 
of corporation tax changes on volatility (or systematic risk) and therefore return on 
equity is of relevance to policy makers as it will influence the change in tax policy.  
 
On the basis of the risk-return trade off and on the assumption that financial 
markets reward investors for taking on systematic risk, ceteris paribus, levered equity 
betas should relate negatively to the corporation tax rate. A re-arrangement of the 
valuation model by Miller and Modigliani (1963) and using a relationship between 
beta of levered equity and that of an unlevered firm as shown by Hamada (1972), the 















From the equation 8 above, ceteris paribus, a negative relationship between beta of 
levered equity and corporation tax rate is expected. 
 










          (9a) 
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This extension was important to the study in two ways. Firstly, it reflected the 
real world situation because most firms operate in economies in which corporate 
profits are taxable. Thus, analysing the effect of leverage (which to some extent is 
influenced by the corporation tax) on beta without corporation tax, was equivalent to 
missing an important bit of a real world phenomenon. Secondly, the study focused on 
the impact of corporation tax reform on systematic risk, therefore, to have a tax 
variable in the model is necessary. 
 
Lasfer (1995) argued that a change in corporation tax has no immediate effect 
on leverage. Based on his argument, the study analysed the effect of T on βL using 
Equation 9a by assuming that both L and βU are constants. In such a situation there 
was a negative relationship between T and βL so long as L lies between 0 and 1. More 











UL ββ  
                                      (9b) 
 
This showed for example that, an increase corporation tax (which is advantage since 
the value of tax shield will increase) led to a decline in systematic risk if that increase 
in tax had no impact on leverage. 
 
However, on the other hand, a significant number of both theoretical and 
empirical studies show that corporation tax is one of the major determinants of capital 
structure and thus, has a profound impact on the debt-equity ratio.  Thus, by using 
equation (8) and expressing L as a function of T, the relationship between βL and T is 












        (10a) 
 
Where re is return on levered equity, i is interest (borrowing) rate, rA is return on 
assets and T is corporation tax rate. From equation (10a), a change in T is positively 
related to a change in beta of equity of a levered common stock. More specifically, a 













        (10b) 
 
Therefore, so long as the rate of return on assets is greater than the borrowing 
rate (and this is almost always the case, otherwise it is irrational to borrow and invest 
in risky assets) and they are both positive, a change in systematic risk βL caused by a 
change in corporation tax rate T is always positive. (A formal derivation of Equation 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data and Research Methodology 
The main objective of the study covered in this paper is to investigate the 
impact of corporation tax on systematic risk by using the corporation tax changes of 
1984 as an event.  The hypothesized relationship is that the change in corporation tax 
affected systematic risk negatively. It should be noted that the change in corporation 
tax affects all corporations simultaneously, but the response depends mainly on the 
corporate tax position of each individual company. For each relevant variable used in 
this study, annual data are drawn from Datastream for the period from 1974 to 2005 
inclusive. The number of firms used to study the impact of tax changes on systematic 
risk is 197. In order to assess a change in systematic risk following the corporation tax 
changes in the UK, I estimate the equity beta using a market model. The estimated 
OLS slope coefficient (a measure of systematic risk) is then used as the dependent 
variable in regression analyses (time series and cross sectional) involving tax related 
variables and a set of fundamental determinants of beta as control variables.  
 
Description and Estimation of Variables Used in the Analysis  
Estimation of systematic risk variables: Two models were used to test the 
significance of tax as a determinant of systematic risk; time series and cross sectional 
regression model. The equity beta (a measure of systematic risk) was estimated using 
market model given in equation (11) below: 
 
jtmtjjjt RR εβα ++=  































R  is annual return on market portfolio represented by FT All Shares 
Index. Item RI is annual total return index drawn from Datastream. The symbol ε 
stands for error term, whereas parameters jj βα ,  represent an intercept term and the 
beta of company j respectively.  
 
The systematic risk (beta) of each company was estimated using annual data 
for each of the 29 years (1977-2005) and two beta variables (periodic beta and 
csbeta,) were estimated. The variable ‘periodic beta’ is the beta calculated using 
market model for each year from 1977 – 2005 inclusive. The variable ‘csbeta’ is 
cross-sectional beta calculated for each company as the arithmetic mean of annual 
betas over 29 years (1977-2005). Note that the ‘periodic beta’ for 1977 was estimated 
using  data points for 1974 to 1977and that a number of data points (observations) 
used to estimate betas for other years increases over time. For time series model we 
used data for 1974 to 2005 to estimate time series variables for 1977 to 2005. For 
cross sectional model, the changes in variable around the tax change period were 
determined by subtracting average value of variable for 1981-1983 from the average 
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Estimation of explanatory variables: Corporate finance theory suggests a number of 
factors that may influence the systematic risk (beta) of a company’s equity. Some of 
the factors have been empirically tested to determine their statistical significance as 
determinants of systematic risk. In this sub section a total of seven factors are 
analysed and their theoretical relationship with beta be explained.  
 
Effective Tax Rate, ETR: This is the variable included to test the hypothesized 
relationship between corporation tax change and systematic risk. It is calculated as a 
ratio of sum of taxation paid (Datastream item 433) and deferred corporation taxes 
(Datastream item 161) to the adjusted total operating profit (Datastream item 137). 
The relationship between effective tax rate and systematic risk in this study depend, 
among other things, on how quick firms adjusted their debt-equity ratios in response 
to the 1984 tax changes. If firms do not respond to the news about changes in 
corporation tax immediately by changing their debt-equity ratio, the corporation tax 
rate is expected to be negatively related to returns and consequently negative related 
to systematic risk (see Equation 1). On the other hand, if firms respond immediately 
to the changes in corporation tax rate by adjusting their leverage ratios, a positive 
relationship between corporation tax rate and systematic risk may be observed. Given 
the differences in tax positions of firms and extent of distortions brought by the pre-
1984 tax changes in corporation tax system to each firm, the relationship between 
ETR and equity beta is not obvious. Some firms were likely to have increased their 
borrowing (and hence their debt-equity ratios) during the transition period in order to 
take advantage of capital allowances. For some firms however, there was no incentive 
to borrow and they might have reduced their debt-equity ratios to reflect 
unattractiveness of debt induced by the tax changes. The overall effect depends, 
among other things, on which group of firm was dominant. To assess the impact of 
tax changes on beta by employing a time series model, I need to introduce a 
multiplicative dummy variable, RPt×ETRpt where RPt = 1 during the tax changes 
period and zero elsewhere. The coefficient of RPt × ETRpt shows the change in 
coefficient of ETR induced by tax change and is expected to be significantly negative 
if the corporation tax reform led to a decrease in systematic risk.  The same negative 
relationship between beta and ETR is expected when changes in the value of the 
variables around the reform period (rather than value at a particular date) are used in 
cross sectional regression. 
 
Leverage ratio, (LEV):  Leverage ratio is estimated as a ratio of total loan capital 
(Datastream item 321) to market value of equity (Datastream item MV). The 
relationship to be tested in this study emanates from the fact that asset betas are 
determined as the weighted averages of betas of debt and equity betas. Accordingly, 
the relationship between equity beta and debt-equity ratio (Ramchand and Sethipakdi, 
2000) is positive as given by equation (4a). The use of debt financing firm’s activities 
increases the variability of earnings available to equity holders and hence systematic 
risk. Thus, ceteris paribus, a positive relationship between beta and LEV is expected. 
 
Return on Assets, (ROA): Return on assets is estimated as a ratio of adjusted total 
operating profit (Datastream item 137) to total assets (Datastream item 392 or TA). 
The relationship between return on assets and systematic risk tested in this study was 
derived from extension to the model Badhani (1997) model (equation 5) to include 
corporation tax.  The relationship is derived in section 3 above. Theoretically, a 
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Previous studies show that ROA, at any time t, is positively related to leverage ratio; 
and since leverage is positively related to beta, the same relationship is implied 
between ROA and beta. However, using equation (10b) above and assuming that the 
change in beta around reform period is caused by the change in corporation tax, the 
coefficient of ROA in cross sectional regression involving the changes in variables 
around the tax reform period is likely to be negative. 
 
Market value of equity, (MV):  Market value is estimated as the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity (Datastream item MV). The relationship between MV and 
systematic risk (beta) is adopted from a non-stationarity model of beta by Brenner and 
Smidt (1977). According to their study, beta at time t is inversely related to market 
value, MV at time t-1. The relationship suggests that small firms’ returns are more 
volatile relative to market returns due to their inability to absorb economic shocks. 
The opposite is true for large firms, which tend to have more stable return. Thus, a 
negative relationship between size and equity beta is expected. 
 
Risk of real assets (RRISK): In this study, the risk of real assets is defined as the 
standard deviation of return on net tangible assets. Return on net tangible assets is 
defined as the ratio of adjusted total operating profits (Datastream item 137) to net 
tangible assets (Datastream item NTA). The implication according Brenner and Smidt 
(1977) is that factors which affect market value have no impact on risk of real assets. 
However, if risk of real assets is defined as given above, factors that cause changes in 
MV may have an effect on the risk of real assets. Consequently, the effect of a 
particular factor on market value will have an impact on return on real assets as well.  
Given that systematic risk is a component of total risk, a change in the risk of real 
assets would be positively related to a change in systematic risk. Thus, a positive 
relationship between RRISK and beta is expected. 
 
Financial Risk (FR): Financial risk is defined as the variations in earnings available 
to shareholders (Datastream item 625) which are not explained by variations in net 
operating income (Datastream item 154). It is given as one minus the ratio of standard 
deviation of earnings available to shareholders to standard deviation of net operating 






−= 1  
                                          (12) 
 
Where EAS is earnings available to shareholders and NOI is net operating income. 
The symbol σ stands for standard deviation. 
 
The relationship between FR and beta is adopted from a study by Kale, Noe and 
Ramirez (1991), which provides evidence of a non-linear relationship between 
business risk and optimal debt.  Since debt is positively related to beta, it can be 
argued that a similar relationship exists between business risk and systematic risk 
(beta). Most studies assume that the nature of business operations for most firms 
remains unchanged, that is, the volatility of net income (or equivalently the financial 
risk) is attributable to other financing related sources. Financial risk is positively 
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systematic risk, the coefficient of financial risk squared, FRSQ is expected to be 
negative. 
 
Growth in earnings, GR: The variable GR is the growth variable estimated as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of earnings available to shareholders (Datastream item 
625) at time t to the same variable at t-1. The relationship between growth in earnings 
and beta as tested in this study was drawn from Hamid et al., (1994) which used a 
market model and Gordon’s valuation model to show that the covariance of earnings’ 
growth rate with beta is positive (see Equation 6). Their conclusion implies that any 
decision which leads to an increase in the growth of earnings will lead to an increase 
in systematic risk and vice versa.  More specifically, this implies that the change in 
corporation tax in 1984, which aimed at reducing the tax burden to corporations, will 
lead to an increase in after-tax earnings and this will have a positive effect on 
systematic risk. Other things remaining constant, this implies that systematic risk is 
positively related to GR. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In analysing the impact of corporation tax changes on equity beta it is 
important to control for the potential effects other variables might have on beta. Thus, 
in order to justify the assertion that the corporation tax is one of the determinants of 
systematic risk and that corporation tax changes of 1984 led to a decline in beta, a 
formal analysis of the relationship between beta and its theoretical determinants is 
conducted. The significance of tax as a determinant of systematic risk (beta) is tested 
using both time series and cross sectional analyses. 
 
Empirical Test and Results: A Time Series Analysis 
In order to test the relationship between beta and the variables described in 
section 4.2 above, the following time series linear regression model is estimated by 
using annual data for a portfolio of 197 UK companies over the period of 29 years, 













    (13) 
 
Where the b’s are parameters to be estimated, variables are as defined in section 4.2 
and εpt is the error term (residual systematic risk of a portfolio) at t.  The estimated 
coefficients and test statistics used to test statistical significance of each coefficient 
are presented on Table 1 (Appendix A).  
 
Table 1 shows that the estimated coefficient of ETR (0.138) is significantly 
positive at 5 percent (p-value is 0.022). This result shows that even after controlling 
for other determinants of systematic risk, ETR continues to influence systematic risk. 
The results also support the view that corporation tax is positively related to debt-
equity ratio and consequently is positively related to beta. It also implies that firms 
adjusted their debt-equity ratios rather immediately to reflect a change in corporation 
tax structure. The results show further that the estimated value of b2 is significantly 
negative as expected. The estimated coefficient (–0.433) is statistically significant at 
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corporation tax change led to a decline in systematic risk. The finding is consistent 
with Vassalou and Xing (2004)’s study which showed that default risk (which is a 
function of debt-equity ratio) is systematic risk and therefore reducing borrowing 
should also reduce default risk and consequently the systematic risk. The estimated 
coefficient of LEV is positive as expected (0.198) but is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels of significance. One possible explanation of insignificance of 
estimated coefficient of LEV is that most of the effects of LEV on beta suggested in 
the literature emanate from corporation tax. Since the coefficient of ETR is positive 
and significant, the insignificance of LEV is not a surprise. The estimated coefficient 
of ROA is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent (p-value is 0.017). This 
supports a view that firms continue to borrow (hence higher leverage ratio over time) 
so long as ROA is greater than borrowing rate (see Equation 10b). Given the positive 
relationship between leverage and beta, the same relationship between ROA and beta 
should exist. The estimated coefficient of MV is negative as expected although it is 
statistically insignificant (the estimated coefficient is –0.0057 with a p-value of 
0.300).  The possible explanation of the weak negative relationship between MV and 
beta is that most of factors that determine MV also determine beta and therefore the 
effect of MV on beta may have been manifested through other variables like LEV and 
ETR. The negative relationship between beta and value is supported by both a 
traditional and a bankruptcy costs argument of capital structure. 
 
 The study also tested whether the relationship between beta and financial risk 
is linear or non-linear. As such two variables, FR and FRSQ were introduced to test a 
non-linear relationship between beta and business risk proposed by Kale et al., 
(1991). Results show that the estimated coefficients of FR and FRSQ are both positive 
but they are statistically insignificant. These results support the view that financial 
risk is positively related to beta and imply that borrowing increases financial risk by 
increasing the volatility of return on equity hence increased systematic risk. 
 
The estimated coefficient of GR is positive as expected. This indicates that 
growth in earnings is positively related to beta. The estimated coefficient, however, is 
statistically insignificant (the estimated coefficient is 0.008 with a p-value of 0.408). 
 
The estimated coefficient of RRISK is positive and highly significant (the 
estimated coefficient is 0.0139 with p-value of 0.006). This result implies that risk of 
real assets is positively related to systematic risk. This implies that most firms do 
diversify their portfolios in the sense that a large proportion of their total real asset 
risk is actually a market risk. The changes in total risk in such a situation should be 
positively related to changes in systematic risk. 
 
In summary, the findings show that ETR is a significant determinant of 
systematic risk and that changes in corporation tax led to a significant decline in 
systematic risk. This result supports empirical evidence provided by Okzan (2001). 
Out of seven variables used as determinants of systematic risk, only the coefficients of 
effective tax rate, return on assets and risk of real assets are statistically significant. 
The signs of estimated coefficients of all other variables are as expected although the 
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Empirical Results: A Cross Sectional Analysis 
The changes in seven variables explained before were used in a cross sectional 
regression analysis to test whether a cross sectional change in corporation tax explains 
a cross sectional change in systematic risk.  The ‘changes’ in variables determined by 
subtracting the values of variables before the tax changes (1981-1983) from their 
respective values after the changes (1988-1990). 
 
The impact of tax changes on systematic risk is assessed through the 
coefficient of two variables, ETR and ROA. The estimated coefficients of both ETR 
and ROA are expected to be significantly negative if the hypothesis that corporation 
tax changes influenced equity beta negatively holds.  The negative coefficient of ETR 
is expected due to the fact that the effective corporation tax rate is inversely related to 
return and consequently negatively related to systematic risk. On the other hand a 
negative coefficient of ROA is derived from equation 10b. The model and results for 
the cross sectional regression is presented on Table 2 (Appendix A).  
 
The estimated coefficient of ∆ETR is negative (-0.257) as expected and 
significant at 5 percent (p-value = 0.012). This supports the argument that ETR is one 
of the determinants of beta and that corporation tax changes led to a decline in 
systematic risk. Given the argument by Miao and Wang (2007) an increase (or 
decrease) in effective tax rate by influencing systematic risk it discourage (or 
encourage) investment. This argument implies that before implementing the change in 
tax policy, policy makers should consider the possible impact on level of investments. 
The estimated coefficient of ∆ROA is also negative (-1.304) as expected and 
statistically significant at 5 percent (p-value = 0.010). This implies that a change in 
beta around the corporation tax changes period is negatively related to ROA as 
provided theoretically in equation (10b).  
 
 The results shown on Table 2 further show that, the signs of the estimated 
coefficients of LEV, FR, and RRISK are positive as expected. This indicates that the 
variables influence systematic risk positively although only a coefficient of RRISK is 
statistically significant at 5 percent. The sign of estimated coefficients of MV and GR 
are inconsistent with the hypothesised relationships and are all statistically 
insignificant. The results on MV suggest that a change in market value in a particular 
direction also lead to a change in systematic risk in the same direction. On the other 
hand, a negative coefficient of GR rejects the assertion made by Hamid et al., (1994) 
and suggests that companies that experienced decreases in growth rate of earnings 
experienced increases in systematic risk and vice versa.  
 
Thus, although the results do not provide empirical evidence to support the 
relationship between systematic risk and all variables as hypothesised in the literature, 
it is evident that corporation tax influences systematic risk and that the corporation tax 
change of 1984 led to a decrease in systematic risk. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
Although the key relationship between corporation tax and systematic risk 
applies in any economy but the estimation of systematic risk assumes that the capital 
markets are efficient and competitive. If the estimation is done in imperfect market it 
is likely that the estimated beta will not be efficient and its use as a measure of 
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its main findings reflect the fact the study was conducted at the period around which 
there is a significant change in corporation tax. A similar study conducted during the 
period without significant change in tax may not produce similar results. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study was to test the significance of corporation tax as a 
determinant of systematic risk by using the corporation tax changes of 1984 in the 
UK.  The study utilised both time series and cross sectional analyses to provide 
empirical evidence that the corporation tax is in fact one of the factors influencing 
systematic risk and that changes in corporation tax led to a significant decline in 
systematic risk. The study also provided evidence to support the view that systematic 
risk is positively related to leverage, return on assets, financial risk, earnings growth 
and the risk of real assets. The findings also show that UK firms adjusted rather 
quickly their capital structure in response to changes in their effective corporation tax 
rates. This is consistent with the findings by Okzan (2001) who found that UK firms 
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APPENDIX A: (Tables) 
First Year Writing down Initial Writing down
1982-83 52 100 25 75 4 30
1983-84 50 100 25 75 4 30
1984-85 45 75 25 50 4 30
1985-86 40 50 25 25 4 30
1986-87 35 0 25 0 4 29







The UK Corporation Tax Rates, 1982 - 1988
Rate of Capital Allowance (%)
Plant and Machinery Industrial Buildings
 
              




TABLE 1: The Estimated Coefficients for the variables hypothesised to influence 
Systematic Risk (beta) of a company: A Time Series Model’s Results 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-value P-value 
Intercept 0.913 0.067 13.65 0.000 
ETR 0.138 0.052 2.64 0.022 
Dt×ETR -0.433 0.071 -6.12 0.000 
LEV 0.198 0.124 1.60 0.136 
ROA 0.866 0.313 2.77 0.017 
MV -0.006 0.005 -1.08 0.300 
FR 0.008 0.006 1.42 0.182 
FRSQ 2.87 E–6 4.17 E–6 0.69 0.504 
GR 0.008 0.009 0.86 0.408 
RRISK 0.014 0.004 3.33 0.006 
R-Squared 88.1%  
 
 
TABLE 2: Cross sectional estimates of coefficients estimated to test the impact of 
corporation tax reform on systematic risk. 
  
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-value P-value 
Intercept 0.024 0.038 0.63 0.527 
∆ETR -0.257 0.102 -2.52 0.012 
∆LEV 0.042 0.050 0.84 0.402 
∆ROA -1.304 0.501 -2.60 0.010 
∆MV 0.037 0.025 1.47 0.143 
∆FR 0.00043 0.00106 0.40 0.686 
∆GR -0.008 0.007 -1.07 0.284 
∆RRISK 0.189 0.091 2.08 0.039 








Deriving the relationship between beta of asset and beta of levered equity under 
corporation tax. 
 
Description of the variables 
C = total capital employed 
D = debt capital 
i = rate of interest (borrowing rate) 
T = corporation tax rate 
rA = return on assets 
re = return on levered equity 
rm = return on market 
βL = beta of levered equity 











By removing brackets and dividing through out by C we get: 
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Using equation (ii) and substituting L for D/C we can write L in terms of other 















Substituting the value of L from (vi) into (v) and removing the brackets we arrive at 













By using quotient rule, the partial derivative of βL with respect to T is given as 
follow: 
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(viii) 
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